INTRODUCTION
The economic model of negligence beginning with Brown (1973) has generally focused on the case of a single injurer and a single efficient standard of care.
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In reality, of course, injurers have different optimal care levels arising from variation in their costs of care. Actual negligence law nevertheless generally sets a single due care standard (the reasonable person standard) to which all injurers must conform, the argument being that the allocative savings from setting individualized standards would be more than offset by the cost of ascertaining individual costs of care and tailoring standards to those differences (Landes and Posner, 1987:127) .
It does not follow from this argument, however, that actual liability rules make no provision for variation in injurer or victim costs of care. For example, Rubinfeld (1987) has argued that when parties to an accident differ in their comparative negligence, and also suggest how certain causality limits in tort law can be interpreted as self-selection devices. 3
THE MODEL
To keep the analysis simple, I consider a unilateral care model in which injurers differ in their costs of care. (I suggest below that the results should also extend to the bilateral care case.) In addition I employ a graphical approach to make the results as transparent as possible.
Let the expected accident costs caused by injurer i be (1)
where ci is his cost of care, x is his level of care, p(x) is the probability of an accident (p'<0, p">0), and D is the victim's damage. Optimal care for injurer i, denoted xi*, therefore solves the first-order condition (2)
from which it follows that injurers with lower costs of care should take more care.
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Injurer i's actual choice of care will depend on his liability in the event of an accident, as dictated by the liability rule, Li. That is, injurer i will choose xi to minimize (3)
where Li may depend on xi, which we assume is observable to the court. It follows from (1) and (3) that a rule of strict liability (i.e., Li=D for all i) will induce all injurers to self-select their individually optimal care levels.
The question is whether this same result can be achieved under a negligence rule. One way that it could is if the court were able to observe each injurer's cost of care and set individualized standards. In most cases, however, information costs preclude this strategy, forcing the court to set a single standard for all injurers.
5 If that standard reflects the "average" injurer's costs 3 See the discussion in Section 3 below. 4 Specifically, differentiating ( 2 ) yields 0x i */ 0c i =21/ p "<0 . 5 When an injurer's costs differ from the average person in an obvious (observable) way, as in the case of blind people and certain professionals, the court can and does employ a different standard (Landes and Posner, 1987:127) . We therefore focus on cases where the court cannot distinguish among injurers.
(as under the reasonable person standard), then two sorts of inefficiencies will result: first, injurers with optimal care levels above the due standard will adjust their care down to the standard, resulting in too little care; and second, injurers with optimal care levels just below the due standard will adjust their care up to the standard, resulting in too much care. Only injurers with optimal care levels well below the due standard will knowingly violate the standard and choose their optimal care levels (Landes and Posner, 1987:chap 5) . Thus, while some self-selection occurs, the outcome is not first-best because of the pooling of injurers at the due standard.
The preceding seems to imply that when the court cannot observe differences in injurers' costs, a negligence rule with a single standard ("simple negligence") cannot achieve the first-best outcome (perfect separation). This conclusion, however, is not necessarily true. To see why not, consider a negligence rule with a single due standard equal to x . That is, let
Also, suppose injurers vary discretely in their costs of care as follows:
implying that (6)
In this setting, the rule in (4) will result in perfect separation of injurers if two conditions are met: (i) the due standard is set at the optimal care level of the lowest cost injurer (i.e., x =xN*), and (ii) all injurers besides the lowest cost injurer find it optimal to violate the due standard. We prove this assertion graphically as follows. First, use (3) to derive the slope of the iso-cost curves for a type-c injurer in (L,x) space:
Note that this expression is positive when the injurer's costs are decreasing (c+p'L<0) and negative when his costs are increasing (c+p'L>0). Thus, isocost curves are inverted U's with the peak at the point where the injurer's costs are minimized. Further, costs are decreasing as the curves shift down and to the left (i.e., toward lower values of x and L), and the peaks also shift left, as shown in Figure 1 . Thus, the peak occurs at injurer i 's optimal care level when Finally, note that
, which implies that the slopes of the iso-cost curves for higher cost injurers are smaller. It follows that the curves for any two types of injurers can intersect only once in (L,x) space. For example, Figure 2 shows the iso-cost curves for two types of injurers, i and i+1, where ci >ci+ 1 . This "single-crossing property" is a crucial feature of all problems involving self-selection (Cooper, 1984) . Figure 3 , which shows the iso-cost curves for the lowest and next-to-lowest cost injurers (N and NE1, respectively) for the case where the due standard is maximal (i.e., x =xN*). Each of these injurers can either choose to meet the due standard and avoid liability (the point (0, xN*)), or select some lesser level of care and face full damages. Clearly, injurer N minimizes costs by meeting the due standard (given that this is his costminimizing level of care anyway), but for the case shown, injurer NE1 faces lower costs by violating the due standard and choosing his optimal care level, xN-1*. This is true because his iso-cost curve through point (D, xN21*), labeled ICN-1 in Figure 3 , is lower than his curve through (0, xN*), labeled ICN-1', indicating that the former point entails lower costs. It should be clear that, a fortiori, all injurers with higher costs prefer their optimal care levels and full liability to the due standard. As a result, perfect separation occurs.
This conclusion shows that self-selection can be achieved under a simple negligence rule as long as the due standard is set high enough that all but the lowest-cost injurer choose to violate it. In equilibrium, therefore, the rule essentially becomes one of strict liability, which we have seen always induces self-selection. Setting a maximal standard, however, does not guarantee perfect separation (i.e., it is a necessary but not a sufficient condition). To illustrate, consider Figure 4 , which shows a case in which injurer N21 prefers to meet the due standard (still set at xN*) rather than to choose his individually optimal care level. In this case, injurers N21 and N pool at the due standard, and perfect separation does not occur. Algebraically, this outcome arises because for injurer N21, cN-1xN
Note that this condition becomes more likely the closer are the optimal care levels of the lowest and next-to-lowest cost injurers, thus making the due standard more attractive. It follows that the separating outcome in Figure 3 requires a sufficient "distance" between xN* and xN-1* so that condition (9) does not hold.
However, when condition (9) does hold, perfect separation can still be achieved by modifying the negligence rule in a particular way. Specifically, starting from the maximal due care standard, liability must increase gradually from zero as injurers choose progressively lower levels of care. This change eliminates the discrete drop in liability at the due standard, thereby reducing the attractiveness to higher-cost injurers of adjusting their care levels upward to the standard. To illustrate, return to Figure 4 and note that, in order to avoid pooling at the due standard (xN*), it is necessary to reduce the cost to injurer N21 of choosing xN-1* rather than xN*. This is accomplished by setting an upper bound on the injurer's liability from choosing xN-1* such that he is just indifferent between choosing xN-1* and xN*. The resulting upper bound is shown by LU N -1 in Figure 4 and is defined by the equation
Thus, for any liability LN-1 D LU N -1 , injurer N21 will prefer his optimal care level to the due standard.
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At the same time, LN-1 cannot be set so low that the lowest cost injurer (injurer N) finds it cost-minimizing to violate the due standard, resulting in a pool at xN-1*. (Obviously this would happen if LN-1=0.) To prevent this, there must also be a lower bound on LN-1 so that injurer N is just indifferent between xN* and xN-1*. This lower bound is shown by LL N -1 in Figure 4 and is defined by the equation
Together, equations (10) and (11) define the bounds for liability corresponding to xN-1* so as to maintain separation of injurers N and N21. Next consider injurer NE2. The problem now is to maintain separation between injurers N21 and N22; that is, to ensure that injurer N22 chooses xN-2* and injurer N21 chooses xN-1*.
9 To do this, suppose that the actual level of liability associated with xN-1* is LN-1*, as shown in Figure 5 , where LN-1* is between LL N -1 and LU N -1 as required above. Figure 5 also shows the iso-cost curves for injurers N21 and N22 through the point (LN-1*, xN-1*) . Based on the above logic, these curves define the range of liability that maintains separation between injurers N22 and N21. Specifically, for any LN-2 [LL N -2 , LU N -2 ], injurer N22 prefers care of xN-2* to xN-1*, and injurer NE1 prefers care of xN-1* to xN-2*. Further, note that the bounds imply that injurer N22 will generally face greater liability than that imposed on injurer NE1 at his optimal care level, 10 but still less than the victim's full damages If we repeat this process for injurers with increasing costs of care, the bounds for liability will continue to shift upward until they eventually encompass the victim's full damages. That is, for some injurer j <N , it will be the case that D [LL j , LU j ]. When that happens, liability for injurer j and all higher cost injurers can be set at D, and they will self-select their optimal care levels. The logic is identical to that for the situation in Figure 2 above, where all injurers the single-crossing property.) More generally, we only need to consider self-selection between "adjacent" injurers. For details, see Cooper (1984) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005:chap 2) .
10 It is possible, given the non-monotonicity of the iso-cost curves, that the lower bound for LN-2 will be less than LN-1*, but the upper bound will always be above LN-1*.
but the lowest cost injurer found it cost-minimizing to violate the due standard and choose their optimal care levels. That example actually represented a special case of the more general model just described, where the bounds for injurer N21 included D (i.e., j=NE1), so imposing full liability on all but the lowest cost injurer was consistent with perfect separation. In that case, simple negligence achieved the first-best outcome, but as argued above, that will only be possible if the optimal care levels of the lowest and next-to-lowest cost injurers are sufficiently separated. More generally, a gradual increase in liability will be necessary to prevent pooling at the due standard.
As a final point, it is important to note that the proposed rule, when it involves a gradation in liability, necessarily restricts the combinations of care and liability that an injurer can choose from. Specifically, it limits the available (x,L) pairs to those that (1) satisfy self-selection, and (2) induce efficient care by all injurer types. Consequently, for a given L, an injurer is not free to choose any x, but must choose the one assigned to it by the liability rule. This "take-itor-leave-it" feature of the proposed rule is characteristic of all sorting models. In the general case of a continuous variation in injurer types, the proposed rule would take the form of a function, L(x), that assigns a particular level of liability to each care choice, where L'<0.
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To be sure, one might object that the cost of designing and implementing such a rule is at least as high as setting individualized standards. Thus, the fully efficient rule does not represent a practical alternative to single-standard negligence rules. The results nevertheless suggest that there are allocative gains to be had from a rule that involves some gradation in liability rather than a discrete jump at the due standard. In the next section, I pursue this insight in the context of actual tort doctrines by asking whether there exist any rules that might promote self-selection in this way, albeit imperfectly.
DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
The liability rule derived in the previous section departs from the traditional Hand-type rule in two ways. First, the due standard of care (i.e., the standard at which liability drops to zero) must be maximal-that is, it must be based on the characteristics of the lowest cost injurer. In contrast, the bulk of negligence law embodies a due standard that is based on the characteristics of the "average" person (Landes and Posner, 1987:126) . Although there are some areas of the law-such as that pertaining to common carriers and certain In terms of the economic model of negligence, the effect of this limitation on liability is to eliminate the discontinuity in damages at the due care standard. Thus, the injurer's liability increases gradually rather than abruptly as his care level falls below the due standard, a result that is consistent with the generalized negligence rule described in Section 2. Consequently, one interpretation of the cause-in-fact requirement is that it allows injurers with differing costs of care to sort themselves out according to their individuallyoptimal care levels, rather than forcing them to cluster at the single due care standard. 13 In short, it transforms the standard negligence rule into a selfselection device exactly along the lines of the analysis in Section 2.
Finally, although the analysis to this point has been conducted in the context of a unilateral care model, the general conclusions should also extend to the bilateral care case. In particular, under comparative negligence both injurers and victims will perceive that their liability increases gradually (rather than abruptly) as they deviate further from the due standard (taking as given the behavior of the other party). As a result, both will find it desirable to tailor their care choices to their individual costs of care rather than clustering at the due 12 See Perkins v. Texas and New Orleans Ry. Co., 243 La. 829, 147 So.2d 646 (1962) . 13 Along these same lines, Schwartz (1998:560) notes that "if an injurer who fails to take the required level of care is liable only for the harm which would have been prevented by taking the required level of care, the injurer will take optimal care rather than the greater level of care required under the legal standard." standard (the Rubinfeld position). It is likely, however, that the sorting will be imperfect on both sides. (It will depend on the distribution of injurer and victim costs, and the compatibility of the self-selection constraints, given the requirement that the injurer's and victim's shares of liability must sum to one). In contrast, single standard rules induce perfect sorting on one side and pooling on the other (the Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar position).
14 Thus, the relative desirability of comparative negligence compared to single standard rules in this regard will depend on whether imperfect sorting on both sides results in lower overall costs than perfect sorting on only one.
CONCLUSION
It is often argued that negligence rules are costlier to implement than strict liability because negligence requires the court to establish a due standard of care, and then to compare the injurer's actual care to it. Administrative costs would be even higher if courts sought to individualize standards based on differences in injurer costs of care. By setting a single standard for all injurers (the reasonable person standard), courts therefore save on administrative costs, but in so doing, they potentially create distortions in the care choices of injurers around the due standard.
The purpose of this paper has been to show that there exists a class of negligence rules that can eliminate these distortions without the need for the court to observe individual injurers' (and victims') costs of care. The key features of such a rule are: (1) the due standard is set at the optimal care level of the lowest cost injurer, and (2) liability is positive and increasing as injurers depart further from the due standard. Although this rule is broadly consistent with limitations in liability implied by the cause-in-fact rule, and also with the gradation of liability under comparative negligence, it does entail a greater administrative burden on courts compared to simple negligence. Thus, the allocative benefits of the proposed changes must be weighed against these higher costs.
